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INTRODUCTION
The globalization of business has resulted in the proliferation of
international commercial partnerships and multinational corpora-
tions that operate in both civil and common law countries. As such,
modern commercial transactions frequently include parties from dis-
parate legal cultures with different notions of fair process. But like
any business relationship, international commercial bonds can break
down, leaving each party to seek what it conceives as a fair resolution.
Consequently, the procedure for resolving such disputes has become
important.'
Each party to an international agreement wants to resolve dis-
putes according to familiar rules and a fair process before a trusted
and impartial decision maker. 2 Accordingly, such parties may prefer
arbitration to litigation because it affords them the freedom to define
the contours of the dispute resolution process.
3
Perhaps more saliently, arbitration allows parties to avoid navigat-
ing a foreign court system, the difficulties of which could impose un-
necessary strain on their commercial relationships.4 In addition, even
if a party is able to obtain a favorable judgment through litigation, it
faces yet another obstacle: it must still execute that judgment against
the assets of the losing party.5 Executing a foreign judgment requires
the winning party to take the judgment to a foreign country's court
system (often that of the losing party) to obtain a newjudgment from
a court with coercive power over the losing party.6 This process can
be arduous and unpredictable because no multilateral covenant gov-
I See William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: Harmonizing Arbitration and
Court Selection, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 26 (1998) (noting the importance
of contractual forum selection mechanisms).
2 See Russell Bennett Stevenson Jr., An Introduction to ICC Arbitration, 14 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 381, 381-85 (1980).
3 See id.
4 See Samuel V. Goekjian, ICC Arbitration from a Practitioner's Perspective, 14J. INr'L L. &
ECON. 407 (1980); Park, supra note 1, at 26; Stevenson, supra note 2, at 381.
5 See Parikshit Dasgupta, Securitization: Crossing Borders and Heading Towards Globaliza-
tion, 27 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 243, 261 (2004). With the emergence of multiparty
litigations in which judgment holders could potentially obtain multiple judgments against
several parties, the judgment enforcement process becomes even more cumbersome.
6 See id. at 261.
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erning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments cur-
rently exists.
7
In contrast, arbitration has become an important alternative to
litigation largely because of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) ,
which has facilitated the process of executing foreign arbitral awards. 9
At the time of this writing, the New York Convention had 142 signato-
ries,1 0 including the United States, which acceded to the convention
after Congress passed implementing legislation in 1970.1"
The New York Convention facilitates the judgment enforcement
process by requiring its signatories to recognize and enforce an arbi-
tral award absent one of seven narrow infirmities delineated within
the treaty.' 2 If the reviewing court finds that any of these defects
exists, it may refuse to enforce the award.' 3 However, because the
New York Convention attempts to enhance the appeal of arbitration
as a dispute-resolving mechanism by making arbitral awards easier to
7 See id. Nation-states and international bodies have repeatedly attempted, without
much success, to draft such international treaties. For example, from 1976 until 1981, the
United States and the United Kingdom initiated and took part in negotiations over the
proposed "Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil Matters." This effort ultimately proved fruitless. See Brian Richard Paige, Comment,
Foreign Judgments in American and English Courts: A Comparative Analysis, 26 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 591, 622 (2003). In addition, the Hague Convention on Private International Law
recently attempted to draft a similar treaty. See id. However, no such treaty appears to be
forthcoming given the disagreement between states over such issues as jurisdiction, e-com-
merce, and intellectual property rights. See id. at 623.
8 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
9 See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, 356 F. Supp. 1, 14 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (citing a House Committee Report stating that encouraging the arbitration of for-
eign disputes involving American businesses was a primary purpose of adopting the New
York Convention).
10 For a complete list of signatories including every major world power and their dates
of accession, see Status, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/
NYConventionstatus.htrnl (last visited Jan. 6, 2007). The large number of signatories al-
lows commercial parties to utilize arbitration because the provisions of the New York Con-
vention will bind many international court systems.
11 See Comment, Foreign Judgments Based on Foreign Arbitral Awards: The Applicability of
ResJudicata, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 223 (1975) [hereinafter Foreign Judgments].
12 See New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V (listing the following as grounds for
refusal: an invalid agreement in writing, failure of notice to a defaulting party, an award
transcending the scope contemplated by the parties, the failure of an arbitral tribunal's
composition or procedure to conform to the agreement of the parties, the lack of a final
award or a decision setting aside an award in the country where rendered, nonarbitrable
subject matter, and an award contrary to the public policy of the state where recognition
and enforcement are sought). The first five defects under Article V, known as the Article
V(1) defenses, relate to procedural defects in the initial arbitration process, while the latter
two defects, known as the Article V(2) defenses, cover potential objections by the enforcing
state to the substance of the award. See id.
13 See id.
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execute, nothing in the treaty prevents a reviewing nation from elect-
ing to enforce a flawed award. 14 The New York Convention also con-
tains a "more favorable right" provision, which states:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not ... deprive any
interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbi-
tral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the
treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied
upon. '
5
Thus, none of the New York Convention grounds for refusal is an au-
tomatic bar to the award holder's recovery. Instead, each constitutes a
permissive ground to deviate from the convention's mandate to recog-
nize and enforce foreign arbitral awards.16
One of the limited grounds for refusing recognition and enforce-
ment of an arbitral award is triggered when a competent authority in
the rendering state sets aside the award.17 Set aside entails a court
refusing to recognize the award's validity under its own domestic
law.' 8 While the New York Convention does not entitle the award-
holding party to recognition or enforcement in such cases, the award
holder might nonetheless be able to obtain foreign recovery upon the
award despite the set aside.19 However, because set aside poses a po-
tential obstacle to foreign enforcement, litigation over the validity of
the award will often occur in the forum where the award originated
either prior to or simultaneous with the award holder's taking it
abroad for enforcement.20 The litigation in the award-rendering state
can occur with the award-holding party either as a defendant arguing
against the loser's action to set aside the award or as a plaintiff seeking
a judgment confirming the validity of its award in the rendering
state's court system. 2'
If the party challenging the validity of the award prevails and the
court invalidates the arbitral award, the party may use the New York
Convention's ground for refusal based on set aside as a defense if the
award holder seeks to enforce the award abroad. 22 In this case, the
14 See id.; Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; a Market Incentive Solu-
tion to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play
in Online Consumer Arbitration, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 57 (2002).
15 New York Convention, supra note 8, art. VII(l).
16 See id. art. V; Gibbons, supra note 14, at 57.
17 See New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V(1) (e).
18 See Catherine A. Giambastiani, Recent Development, Lex Loci Arbitri and Annul-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards in U.S. Courts, 20 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 1101, 1107 (2005).
19 See, e.g., Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907
(D.D.C. 1996); Ray Y. Chan, Note, The Enforceability of Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards in the
United States: A Critique of Chromalloy, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 141, 208 (1999).
20 See Foreign Judgments, supra note 11, at 226-28.
21 See id.
22 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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New York Convention anticipates the possibility of inconsistency be-
tween a foreign arbitral award and a foreign judgment negating its
validity in the rendering state. Article V of the Convention explicitly
resolves this potential inconsistency by allowing the state in which the
award holder seeks enforcement to decide whether to follow the arbi-
trator's award or the foreign court's judgment.
23
However, the Convention does not address the potential for con-
sistency between a foreign arbitral award and a judgment in the ren-
dering state. What happens if the award holder prevails and secures a
foreign judgment that upholds the validity of the arbitral award? How
should such a foreign judgment relate to the award itself? If the
award holder then seeks recognition and enforcement from a court of
a signatory to the New York Convention, what factors should guide the
decision of that court?
Despite a paucity of literature and case law on this issue, it seems
that the few American courts and scholars that have tried to resolve
the relationship between foreign awards and confirmation judgments
have argued for treating the award and the judgment as distinct enti-
tlements, either of which the holder may execute.2 4 Therefore, this
approach treats arbitral awards and confirmation judgments as "paral-
lel entitlement[s]" 25 and gives the party that prevailed in the initial
arbitration two avenues through which to pursue relief. The party
may either seek recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award
under the New York Convention or attempt to enforce the rendering
state's judgment under provisions for recognizing foreign judgments
in the enforcing state.2 6 The United States' commitment under the
New York Convention to promote arbitration seems to justify perceiv-
ing arbitral awards and confirmation judgments as parallel entitle-
ments because such an approach confers an additional ground for
recognition upon the award holder, thereby making enforcement
more likely and enhancing the appeal of arbitration.27 Indeed, the
23 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
24 See Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex
Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1994); Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825
F.2d 709, 713-14 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., 737 F.2d 150, 154
(2d Cir. 1984); Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975); Island Terri-
tory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973); Oriental Commercial &
Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, N.V., 769 F. Supp. 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); ALBERT JAN VAN DEN
BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION 346 (1981); Foreign Judgments, supra note 11, at 223; see also Fratelli Dami-
ano snc v. August Topfer & Co., Award No. 117 (Corte di cassazione, Mar. 13, 1991),
reprinted in 17 Y.B. COM. ARB. 559 (1992) (representing a similar foreign perspective: an
Italian court supporting the parallel entitlements approach).
25 TIBOR VARADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECrIVE 688 (3d ed. 2006).
26 See id.
27 See infra Part I.B.2.
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parallel entitlements approach goes beyond the New York Conven-
tion's requirements by allowing an award-holding party to secure en-
forcement of an award that may be deficient under the Convention
itself.28
While at first glance this issue might seem to be mere "procedural
underbrush,"29 the manner in which a party decides to pursue its enti-
tlement in the United States has important consequences for litiga-
tion strategies as well as national policy. Causes of action to recognize
and enforce a foreign arbitral award have shorter statutes of limita-
tions than those to enforce a foreign judgment. 30 As such, a court
recognizing both entitlements may allow a plaintiff to file a claim
based on a stale award under the pretext of a foreign judgment.
31
Further, enforcing an arbitral award as a judgment may deny defend-
ants a formal means of pleading the defenses that would ordinarily
apply to defective arbitral awards under the New York Convention.
32
Finally, because the New York Convention applies in the United States
as a matter of federal law,3 3 whereas parties usually seek to enforce
foreign judgments as a matter of state law,34 allowing a litigant to pur-
sue enforcement of either the arbitral award or the foreign judgment
may have important ramifications for jurisdictional tactics as well as
conflict-of-laws issues.35 In each of these ways, the parallel entitle-
ments approach allows a party to circumvent the procedures for rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards laid out in the
28 See infra Part III.
29 Foreign Judgments, supra note 11, at 248.
30 See infra Part III.B.l.
31 See Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex
Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1994). For a full treatment of the statute of limitations
issue in this case, see infra Part III.B.1.
32 See Ocean Warehousing B.V. v. Baron Metals & Alloys, 157 F. Supp. 2d. 245
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); infra Part III.B.2.
33 The United States implemented the New York Convention through federal legisla-
tion codified in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2000). This legislation grants original jurisdiction to
federal district courts for such actions and deems such actions to "arise under the laws and
treaties of the United States." Id. § 203. It also facilitates the removal of such cases to
federal court. See id. § 205. As such, federal question jurisdiction exists for enforcement
claims under the convention via 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and they can be readily removable from
state to federal court without regard to the citizenship of the parties by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b).
34 Many states have legislation regarding the recognition of foreign judgments. See,
e.g., Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, 489 F.2d 1313, 1318 (1973) (discussing
New York's passage of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney 1997)). At the time of this writing, forty-three of the fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands had passed some version of the Act.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 54 (McKinney 1997). No analogous federal law exists for the recognition
and enforcement of foreign money judgments. As such, parties can assert these state law
claims in federal courts only if diversity jurisdiction exists.
35 See infta Part III.B.3.
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New York Convention and its implementing legislation 36 by seeking
enforcement of the same underlying award as a foreign judgment.
The New York Convention allows a party holding a foreign arbi-
tral award to invoke the coercive authority of the courts of a signatory
to execute upon its entitlement against the losing party.37 The Con-
vention binds its signatories to follow its provisions.38 However, by
interpreting foreign confirmation judgments as triggers of indepen-
dent causes of action, courts have expanded the arsenal of a party
seeking to enforce a foreign award beyond that which the Convention
requires. 39 While the New York Convention's pro-arbitration motiva-
tions support this stance, 40 allowing a party to prosecute a foreign
judgment based on an arbitral award in lieu of the award itself may
vitiate the policies underlying statutes of limitations, sovereignty, and
jurisdiction.
This Note takes the position that because of the significant strate-
gic advantages it creates for award holders, the parallel entitlements
approach does not satisfactorily resolve the question of how a foreign
arbitral award relates to a foreign judgment confirming it. Courts
could achieve proper deference to New York Convention obligations
without creating any potential for abuse by viewing confirmation judg-
ments as limited in scope to the country rendering the judgment. Do-
ing so would strike a better balance by allowing American courts to
apply res judicata principles of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel
to aid plaintiffs in New York Convention cases, while simultaneously
preventing plaintiffs from taking advantage of the court system's
power of compulsion at the expense of national policy. Part I exam-
ines the theoretical possibilities for categorizing the relationship be-
tween foreign arbitral awards and foreign confirmation judgments
and assesses the validity of these competing views in light of the obli-
gations that the New York Convention imposes. Part II explores the
judicial decisions that have adopted the parallel entitlements ap-
proach and analyzes their reasoning. Part III attempts to catalogue
and explain the ways in which award-holding plaintiffs can take advan-
tage of the parallel entitlements framework. Part IV argues for a
slightly modified version of the limited-in-scope approach as a supe-
rior model for analysis in this context and develops a proposal for
implementing this approach.
36 See infra Part II.
37 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
38 See id.
39 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.




THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARBITRAL AWARDS
AND CONFIRMATION JUDGMENTS
A. Theoretical Possibilities
There is relatively little literature about the interaction between
the arbitral award and the judgment that arises from a parallel pro-
ceeding. To the extent that the question has been raised, however,
three possible results have been suggested. 41 One possibility, based
on the usual operation of claim preclusion, is that the arbitral award
merges into the confirmation judgment. This view contends that the
judgment nullifies the award and replaces it with ajudgment the party
can seek to enforce. 42 However, this "merger" approach becomes
problematic if applied outside the country issuing the award. 43 Be-
cause the New York Convention applies only to foreign arbitral awards
and not to foreign judgments, the extraterritorial merger approach
would render the convention inapplicable by converting awards cov-
ered by the Convention into judgments beyond its scope.44
As such, some scholars have advanced a second view, which holds
that the merger occurs only within the rendering state and has no
extraterritorial effect.45 Thus, under this "limited-in-scope" merger
theory, the award holder would execute the judgment if pursuing en-
forcement in the rendering state but would pursue recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award if seeking to recover outside of that
country.
4 6
In the United States, some courts have adopted a third view of
the interaction between a confirmation judgment and an arbitral
award. 47 These courts consider the foreign judgment to be a separate
and distinct claim from the arbitral award upon which it is based.
Therefore, litigation in the rendering state creates parallel entitle-
ments upon either of which the party may take action. 48 As a result,
41 See VARADY ET AL., supra note 25, at 687-88.
42 See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 24, at 347 (citing a German case in which the respon-
dent made such an argument).
43 See id. at 347-48; infra Part I.B.1.
44 See VAN DEN BERG supra note 24, at 347-48; infra Part I.B.1.
45 See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 24, at 347-48; VARADY ET AL., supra note 25, at 688; see
also COSID, Inc. v. Steel Auth. of India (High Court of Delhi,July 12, 1985), reprinted in 11
Y.B. COM. ARB. 502, 505 (1986) (holding that ajudgment gave the plaintiff two obligations
to enforce in a domestic court but had no extraterritorial effect).
46 See VARADY ET AL., supra note 25.
47 See infra Part II.
48 See V.C. Govindaraj, Foreign Arbitral Awards and Foreign Judgments Based upon Such
Awards, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1465, 1465 (1964). As Govindaraj notes:
[T]here is consensus among jurists .. . that while non-merger of the origi-
nal cause of action in the judgment is the rule, conferring on the plaintiff
thereby the option either to resort to the original ground of action or to
580 [Vol. 92:573
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these courts have been willing to entertain and decide cases based
solely on the foreign confirmation judgment.
B. Evaluating the Validity of the Three Approaches in Light of
the New York Convention
1. The Extraterritorial Merger Approach
Because the merger approach holds that a foreign confirmation
judgment replaces the foreign arbitral award, it creates only one nar-
row route for enforcement-the newly authored foreign judgment.4
9
While this approach might be effective in the country where both de-
cisions were rendered, a significant problem arises outside the render-
ing state: merging the two entitlements makes the otherwise
enforceable arbitral award unenforceable because of the rendering
state's judgment.
50
Extraterritorial merger allows a defendant in a proceeding for
the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award filed under the
New York Convention to argue that the award's merger with the for-
eign judgment bars the plaintiffs action upon the award. 51 Thus,
under the merger approach, despite affirming the arbitral award's va-
lidity, the foreign judgment simultaneously nullifies the award as an
enforceable entitlement and forces the plaintiff to pursue relief based
solely on the confirmation judgment. Exacerbating this somewhat ab-
surd situation, this approach would in effect render the New York
Convention inapplicable by translating actions that fall within its
scope (pursuing recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards) into actions beyond its umbrella (filing for the enforcement
of foreign confirmation judgments). 52 Because it eliminates the oper-
ation of the New York Convention, the merger approach contravenes
the treaty's goal of promoting arbitration as an alternate mechanism
for resolving international disputes.
53
In addition to displacing the New York Convention procedurally,
the extraterritorial merger approach seems to violate specific provi-
sions of the Convention as well. Because the New York Convention
encourages the use of arbitration, it limits the grounds upon which
the courts of its signatories can refuse to recognize and enforce a final
sue on the judgment recovered . . . the foreign judgment ... nonetheless
creates a legal obligation which may be enforced by action in any country.
Id.
49 See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 24, at 347.
50 See id. at 348 (noting the "absurd situation" created if enforcement in the country
of origin results in the award's unenforceability abroad due to resjudicata).
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
2007]
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arbitral award to the seven infirmities outlined in Article V.54 A signa-
tory that renders an award invalid for a reason other than those seven
listed deficiencies violates its obligations under the Convention, 55 and
refusal based on the merger of an arbitral award into a judgment ar-
guably constitutes such an invalid justification for nonrecognition be-
cause it does not fall within the scope of Article V.56
However, one could arguably construe the doctrine of extraterri-
torial merger within the New York Convention's procedural frame-
work. While the Convention does not specifically list res judicata
policies as a basis for refusal, Article V(2) (b) creates an exception if
"[t] he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of [the reviewing] country."57 Many courts in the
United States, including the Supreme Court, value res judicata as a
matter of public policy.58 Therefore, one could argue that refusing to
enforce an arbitral award because it has been converted into a judg-
ment under the merger approach nevertheless meets New York Con-
vention obligations because applying resjudicata constitutes refusal as
a matter of public policy under Article V.59 While this argument does
not seem entirely unfounded, the public policy ground for denying
enforcement of an arbitral award has generally been construed nar-
rowly.60 Thus, the extraterritorial merger approach seems to create a
ground for refusal that falls outside the ambit of the New York
Convention.
2. The Parallel Entitlements Approach
In contrast to the merger approach, which defeats New York Con-
vention awards by merging them into judgments, the parallel entitle-
ments approach augments the probability of recognizing and
54 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
55 See New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V (stating "recognition and enforce-
ment of the award may be refused.., only if' the court finds the award deficient for one of
the seven listed grounds ) (emphasis added); see also 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2000) (incorporating
these obligations into the federal statute implementing the New York Convention); Leo-
nard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE LJ. 1049, 1066 (1961) (explaining the
obligations of signatories to the New York Convention).
56 See New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V.
57 New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V(2) (b).
58 See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 345 (2005)
("The doctrine of resjudicata serves vital public interests .... .") (quotation omitted).
59 At the meetings for drafting the New York Convention, Italy argued that it would
handle cases of resjudicata under the "public policy" provision in Article V(2) (b). See U.N.
Doc. E./CONF.26/SR.17, at 15 (1958); see also Quigley, supra note 55, at 1071 n.93 (noting
that Italy's interpretation of "public policy" includes cases of resjudicata).
60 See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (limiting use of the New York Conven-
tion's Article V(2) (b) public policy ground to cases "where enforcement would violate the
forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice").
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enforcing awards. Recall that the parallel entitlements approach al-
lows a plaintiff to seek relief under either the foreign arbitral award or
the foreign confirmation judgment,6' and nothing prevents the plain-
tiff from pressing both claims simultaneously. 62 The parallel entitle-
ments approach facilitates enforcement by allowing the plaintiff an
additional mechanism to enforce its award. This result finds support
under the "more favorable right" provision in Article VII of the New
York Convention, 63 which allows for the recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards under the domestic law of the enforcing state, even
if the Convention itself would not obligate that signatory to enforce
the award. 64 Because a court's choice to enforce a confirmation judg-
ment enhances the possibility for recognition of the initial arbitral
award, the parallel entitlements approach clearly falls within the New
York Convention's framework.
3. The Limited-in-Scope Merger Approach
Viewing the confirmation judgment's merger effect as limited in
scope to the rendering state's own court system seems acceptable
under the New York Convention. The limited-in-scope approach
views a plaintiff as having only one forum-specific entitlement wher-
ever it presses its claim. 65 In the rendering state, the judgment has
merged with the award, leaving the plaintiff with only the judgment to
prosecute. Abroad, however, the judgment has no claim-preclusive or
claim-expansive effect, leaving the plaintiff with only the foreign
award to pursue.66 In contrast to the parallel entitlements approach,
the limited-in-scope approach simply ignores the confirmation judg-
ment for the purpose of evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiffs claim
based on a foreign arbitral award. But confirmation judgments could,
and should, still have significant res judicata implications, including
important collateral estoppel effects. 67 However, judgments have no
effect on whether plaintiffs' claims withstand challenges to their suffi-
ciency such as timeliness or jurisdiction bars. 68 Unlike the merger ap-
61 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
62 See Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 711 (2d Cir. 1987).
63 See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 24, at 349.
64 See New York Convention, supra note 8, art. VII.
65 See VARADO ET AL., supra note 25.
66 See id.
67 See infra Part 1V.B.
68 While the argument that even these grounds are illegitimate reasons for refusing to
recognize and enforce a foreign award under the New York Convention may be made
here, the sufficiency grounds seem more clearly to fall within the narrowly defined public
policy exception of Article V(2) (b) because of a nation's strong need to control its own
dockets. See New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V(2) (b); cf supra text accompanying
notes 57-60 (discussing use of the New York Convention's public policy exception to vindi-
cate national interests in resjumdicata).
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proach, which invalidates otherwise enforceable foreign awards by
replacing them with confirming foreign judgments, 69 perceiving the
confirmation judgment as nonbinding outside the rendering state has
no effect on the validity of the underlying award. Moreover, since the
foreign court's validating judgment does not constitute a foreign arbi-
tral award, no obligation to recognize and enforce it exists under the
New York Convention. 70 As such, this approach neither hinders nor
aids the enforcement process and does not violate a signatory's obliga-
tions under the New York Convention.
71
II
PARALLEL ENTITLEMENTS: THE PREVAILING APPROACH
IN THE UNITED STATES?
Since acceding to the New York Convention in 1970, the United
States has addressed a number of questions related to international
commercial arbitration. 72 However, the relationship between confir-
mation judgments and arbitral awards has rarely been addressed
outside the Second Circuit. 73 This has occurred in large part because
the vast majority of arbitration enforcement actions are filed in New
York.74 Moreover, New York's uniform judgment statute affords liti-
gants significant leeway in enforcing foreign judgments. 75 Regardless
of the reason for New York's unusually developed precedent, its law
represents the most important statement of law in this area. Over a
twenty-year period, the Second Circuit adopted the parallel entitle-
ments approach to confirmation judgments.
76
69 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
70 See New York Convention, supra note 8, art. I.
71 But see infra Part IV.B (arguing for issue preclusion of the foreign court's decision,
which could aid the enforcement process).
72 See, e.g., Ministry of Def. of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 969 F.2d 764,
771 (9th Cir. 1992) (addressing whether an arbitral award fell within the scope of arbitra-
tion contemplated by the parties as required by Article V(1) (c)). Many of these cases like-
wise address the scope and application of the New York Convention defenses outlined
supra note 12.
73 See supra note 24 (citing relevant Second Circuit cases). But see Karaha Bodas Co. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 367-68 (5th Cir.
2003) (discussing enforcement actions in courts of "primary" jurisdiction as prevalent
under the New York Convention).
74 Cf Lionel Kennedy, Note, Enforcing International Commercial Arbitration Agreements
and Awards Not Subject to the New York Convention, 23 VA.J. INT'L L. 75, 87 (1982) (referring
to New York's "preeminence" in the areas of commerce and arbitration law in relation to
enforcing arbitral awards falling outside the New York Convention's scope).
75 See Porisini v. Petricca, 456 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (characterizing
New York as "relatively generous" in recognizing foreign judgments). But see Victrix S.S.
Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Neither the award nor the
judgment may be viewed in isolation.").
76 See Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex
Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1994); Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512
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The Second Circuit first addressed the issue in Island Territory of
Curacao v. Solitron Devices.77 In that case, the court held that a judg-
ment confirming an arbitral award could be enforced as a foreign
money judgment under New York's foreign judgment recognition
statute. 78 In articulating its decision, the court declined to decide the
validity of the underlying arbitral award and left open the question of
whether the extraterritorial merger doctrine applied.79 By determin-
ing that the foreign arbitral award's validity was immaterial to a deci-
sion based on the judgment"° and by allowing Curacao to recover
upon the foreign confirmation judgment, the court adopted the par-
allel entitlements approach,8 1 accepting the foreign confirmation
judgment as a distinct entitlement to Curacao's recovery upon the ar-
bitral award.
8 2
The Second Circuit's decision in Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co. con-
firmed the holding of Island Territory of Curacao.8s The court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a Japanese arbitral award, which would
have had the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment under
Japanese law, allowed the award-holding party to execute its award as
ajudgment in New York.8 4 In affirming the district court's decision to
treat the arbitral award as an award under the New York Convention
rather than a judgment, the Second Circuit noted that "the Japanese
arbitral award may not itself be treated as a foreign money judg-
ment."8 5 While at first blush Fotochrome seems to contradict the paral-
lel entitlements doctrine announced in Island Territory of Curacao, the
court did not explicitly reject that approach. Instead, the Second Cir-
cuit elected to weave its decision through the framework of its earlier
opinion by distinguishing between an arbitral award that is a self-exe-
cuting judgment under foreign law (as in Fotochrome) and an arbitral
award accompanied by a judgment confirming it (as in Island Territory
of Curacao).86 While a court's confirmation judgment would lead to
parallel entitlements, the normal operation of a foreign statute would
not.
8 7
(2d Cir. 1975); Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir.
1973).
77 489 F.2d at 1313.
78 See id. at 1323. New York's foreign money judgments recognition statute can be
found at N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301-5309 (McKinney 1997).




83 517 F.2d 512, 518 (1975).
84 See id. at 518-19.
85 See id.




Despite some ambiguous dicta, the Second Circuit has consist-
ently applied the parallel entitlements approach to foreign judgments
based on arbitral awards since Fotochrome. In Waterside Ocean Naviga-
tion Co. v. International Navigation, Ltd., the court expressed concern
regarding the "duplicative litigation" created by confirmation judg-
ments: "We do not think that the goals of the [New York] Convention
would be served by having Waterside confirm the awards in England
and then seek to enforce the English judgment in the United
States."88 Despite this foreboding language, the court cited the Island
Territory of Curacao opinion and took for granted the parallel entitle-
ments model.s9 Importantly, the Second Circuit later interpreted this
language in Waterside to foreclose the merger issue it had left open in
Island Territory of Curacao because the Waterside court upheld the dis-
trict court's enforcement of the foreign arbitral award even though a
foreign court had already converted the award into a possibly flawed
judgment.90 Consequently, Waterside is the analogue to Island Territory
of Curacao, and the two cases together embody the parallel entitle-
ments approach: the court may elect to recognize and enforce either
the foreign arbitral award or the foreign confirmation judgment irre-
spective of the validity of the other claim. Subsequent Second Circuit
cases have sustained this view. 91
III
LITIGATION TACTICS CREATED BY APPLYING THE
PARALLEL ENTITLEMENTS APPROACH
A. Overview
Under the parallel entitlements approach, the award-holding
party can enforce either the arbitral award by federal statute, 92 or the
judgment confirming the award through state law on the enforcement
of foreign judgments.9 3 Despite conventional wisdom that it is easier
to enforce a foreign arbitral award than a foreign judgment, the for-
eign confirmation judgment may often be the preferable entitlement
to pursue given some tactical advantages that foreign judgments have.
For example, a plaintiff may elect to file a claim based on the judg-
ment rather than the arbitral award if the arbitral award's statute of
88 737 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 1984).
89 See id.
90 See Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 714 n.3 (2d Cir. 1987).
91 See, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v.
Navimpex Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1994).
92 The New York Convention is codified as part of United States federal law, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-207 (2005). 9 U.S.C. § 203 allows for federal jurisdiction over claims for the recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards covered by the convention.




limitations for enforcement has run,9 4 or if the plaintiff desires to cir-
cumvent the defendant's possible assertion of the deficiencies out-
lined in Article V of the New York Convention.95 Further, by properly
designing its claim, a plaintiff can prevent the defendant from remov-
ing the action to federal court.96 Finally, a plaintiff's forum selection
may also enable it to choose the substantive law that governs whether
the entitlement is recognized and enforced.
97
B. Tactics Created by Pursuing a Confirmation Judgment in
Lieu of an Arbitral Award
1. Circumvention of Statutes of Limitations
Under the federal law incorporating the New York Convention,
actions based on foreign arbitral awards must be filed within three
years.9 8 By contrast, actions filed based on state uniform-judgment
statutes may not carry any statutes of limitations.9 9 As such, under the
parallel entitlements approach, a plaintiff may be able to file an other-
wise stale foreign arbitral award as a timely claim to enforce a foreign
confirmation judgment. In Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesell-
schaft MBH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala,
the Second Circuit allowed this tactic when it enforced an award
presented as a confirmation judgment despite the lapse of the statute
of limitations for enforcing the award under the New York Conven-
tion. 0 0 The court's decision seems more striking given that the Sec-
ond Circuit itself had previously ruled that the arbitral award was stale
and therefore unenforceable. 10 1 Despite the initial entitlement's fail-
ure, the award holder in Seetransport received a favorable disposition
because the Second Circuit saw the French court's grant of exequatur
as a foreign judgment that gave rise to a new and independent
entitlement.102
While this reasoning flows logically from the parallel entitlements
model, it contravenes the policies underlying the statute of limitations
for foreign arbitral awards. Statutes of limitations exist to ensure re-
94 See infra Part III.B.1.
95 See infra Part III.B.2.
96 See infra Part III.B.3.
97 See infta Part III.B.4.
98 See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2000). In contrast, domestic arbitral awards have only a one-
year statute of limitations under the Federal Arbitration Act. Problems in Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 77, 78 (1995).
99 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney 1997) (containing no limitations
provision).
100 See Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex
Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 1994).
101 See Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex
Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir. 1993).
102 See Seetransport, 29 F.3d at 82.
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pose for defendants. 10 3 In the context of foreign arbitral awards, the
statute of limitations defines a time lapse after which the party subject
to the award may feel secure that its assets lie outside the reach of the
award holder. Such a provision allows parties subject to arbitral
awards to make rational decisions about the disposition of their as-
sets.' 0 4 Additionally, statutes of limitations prevent courts from having
overburdened dockets and from adjudicating claims without sufficient
evidence due to the lapse of time. 10 5 Thus, statutes of limitations in
the arbitral award context secure important interests for the United
States by ensuring that parties with assets in the United States can ra-
tionally allocate them and prevent untimely litigation from overbur-
dening U.S. courts. Because the parallel entitlements approach
ignores the statute of limitations for foreign arbitral awards enforced
in the United States, it overlooks these interests. In this sense, the
ability of an award holder to circumvent the statute of limitations for
foreign arbitral award claims undercuts the congressional intent in en-
acting the three-year time frame for filing claims under the New York
Convention.
2. Circumvention of New York Convention Defenses
Filing claims based on confirmation judgments under the parallel
entitlements approach also allows award holders to avoid defendants'
assertions of Article V defenses. Article V of the New York Convention
outlines grounds for the refusal of a signatory to recognize and en-
force a foreign arbitral award. 10 6 While a signatory may still elect to
enforce an award that suffers from one or more Article V deficien-
cies, 10 7 the criteria listed in Article V both provide the party seeking to
avoid enforcement with an arsenal of defenses and enable the party to
flag possible defects for the reviewing court to examine before issuing
a judgment on the award.
In contrast, a party defending against the enforcement of a for-
eign judgment generally has only defenses based on international
public policy interests. 10 8 Courts have typically construed these de-
fenses narrowly and accorded significant deference to foreign awards
that meet basic notions of due process.10 9 As a result, if an award-
103 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSiS OF LAW 603 (6th ed. 2003) (outlin-
ing several policy reasons for statutes of limitations).
104 Cf., e.g., id. (describing how statutes of limitations in tort suits allow businesses to
plan activities with greater certainty).
105 See id.
106 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
108 See, e.g., Society of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 330-32 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating
that a breach of contract action is not contrary to Texas public policy).




holding party chooses to enforce the arbitral award as a foreign judg-
ment, it may limit the grounds on which the defendant can object to
its enforcement. This may lead a court to enforce an award that it
might otherwise deem unenforceable under Article V.
While federal courts of appeals have not ruled on the use of this
tactic, the Southern District of New York has allowed a plaintiff hold-
ing parallel entitlements to enforce its confirmation judgment in a
manner that prevented the defendant from asserting such Article V
defenses." 0 The court allowed the tactic because although the defen-
dant could not assert the New York Convention defenses in the sec-
ond proceeding, it had the opportunity to raise these defenses in the
initial litigation to confirm the judgment in the Netherlands.I The
court reasoned that such defenses "simply do not apply to an Article
53 proceeding seeking recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment, even if that judgment was based on a foreign arbitral
award."'1 2 While the district court seemed ambivalent about whether
a party defending against a foreign judgment would ever have an op-
portunity to plead Article V defenses at the recognition and enforce-
ment stage, 1 3 this issue did not affect the court's holding.
1 14
Article V defenses exist to protect defendants from the enforce-
ment of a deficient award and to afford a screening mechanism to the
enforcing state before employing the coercive power of its courts.
11 5
In outlining the Article V defenses, the New York Convention bal-
ances a pro-arbitration stance with national sovereignty because na-
tions should have the right to refuse to enforce awards that run afoul
of basic notions ofjustice. 116 While these defenses constitute only per-
missive grounds on which a court can refuse to enforce a judgment,
Article V defenses ensure that a review of the award for fair process
occurs at the enforcement stage. By permitting parties to enforce
awards via foreign confirmation judgments while ignoring defend-
ants' assertions of Article V defenses (as in Ocean Warehousing B. V v.
Baron Metals & Alloys),' 17 courts enforce awards without first consider-
ing a potentially problematic arbitration process.
10 See Ocean Warehousing B.V. v. Baron Metals & Alloys, 157 F. Supp. 2d 245, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). But see Svendska Handselbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448, 450-51 (D.
Mass. 1966) (holding that under Massachusetts state law a "defendant is entitled to all of
the defenses he might have made to the original action" in the context of a nonarbitration
case).
III See Ocean Warehousing, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
112 Id. at 249.
113 See id. at 250 & n.8.
114 See id. at 250.
115 See Quigley, supra note 55, at 1067-71.
116 See New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V(2) (b).
117 See Ocean Warehousing, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
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Parties defending against the enforcement of a confirmation
judgment might be able to mitigate this concern by making equitable
arguments. For example, a defendant could assert Article V defenses
in a circuitous fashion by alerting the court to the apparent circum-
vention of the New York Convention that would occur in an action
based on a confirmation judgment. However, there is no assurance
that courts would be receptive to this type of argument. If not, then
allowing award-holding parties to eliminate the Article V grounds as
defenses would present a real danger.
3. Destruction of Federal Jurisdiction
Since the New York Convention applies by federal statute, origi-
nal federal jurisdiction exists for claims based on foreign arbitral
awards. 118 Nevertheless, because the statute does not grant exclusive
jurisdiction to federal courts, it necessarily assigns concurrent jurisdic-
tion to state courts.' 19 However, even for an action filed in state court,
the defendant can still remove the case to federal court based on fed-
eral question jurisdiction. 120 As such, Congress's incorporation of the
New York Convention into U.S. law ensures that many cases decided
under the Convention will be resolved in the federal courts.
Conversely, if the award-holding party seeks instead to enforce
the foreign judgment confirming the arbitral award, it can file it
under a state's foreign-judgments recognition statute in state court.'
21
If brought under state law, a defendant cannot remove the action to
federal court unless other grounds for federal jurisdiction exist.122
Given that parties can take legitimate measures to destroy diversity
jurisdiction, 123 a party seeking enforcement of its foreign confirma-
tion judgment could potentially create exclusive state jurisdiction for
that claim.
118 See 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2000).
119 See id.; see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459-61 (1990) (holding that states
have concurrentjurisdiction unless divested "by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistak-
able implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatability between state-court
jurisdiction and federal interests"); Gulf Offshore Corp. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
477-78 (1981) (outlining reasons for the general presumption of concurrent jurisdiction
for cases arising under federal laws).
120 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (2000). Because 9 U.S.C. § 203 grants original jurisdiction
to federal district courts and specifies New York Convention actions as "arising under the
laws and treaties of the United States," § 1441 (a) applies. Moreover, 9 U.S.C. § 205 further
relaxes formal removal requirements, implying that actions based on federal arbitral
awards should be readily removable to federal courts because of the strong federal interest
at stake.
121 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney 1997).
122 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
123 Although 28 U.S.C. § 1359 prevents parties from collusively creatingfederaljurisdic-
tion, nothing in the statute bars parties from intentionally destroyingjurisdiction. See Ridge-
land Box Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 82 F. Supp. 274, 276 (E.D.S.C. 1949).
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The Southern District of New York again provides precedent sup-
porting such forum shopping. 124 In Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v.
Sompo Japan Insurance Co., the court held that the New York Conven-
tion, along with its federal enabling statute, 9 U.S.C. § 203, "does not
provide federal jurisdiction for an action seeking a declaration of the
preclusive effect of a prior decision confirming an arbitral award."'
125
While Gerling involved a domestic judgment confirming a foreign arbi-
tral award, the language of the court's opinion would also seem to
cover a case involving a foreign confirmation judgment. 126 The dis-
trict court concluded that Second Circuit precedent narrowly defined
the statute to confer federal jurisdiction when the invoking party seeks
"either to compel arbitration or confirm an arbitral award."1 27 An ac-
tion to enforce a foreign judgment falls into neither of those catego-
ries. The literal wording of the opinion therefore implies that award-
holding parties can destroy federal jurisdiction by filing a claim to en-
force the foreign confirmation judgment under a state foreign judg-
ments statute.1 28 Courts in the Second Circuit are unlikely to
overlook this formality and accept jurisdiction.
Because the New York Convention is an international treaty rati-
fied by the United States, it imposes international legal obligations
upon U.S. courts to follow its provisions. 129 Recognizing this, Con-
gress assigned federal jurisdiction to claims arising under the conven-
tion in 9 U.S.C. § 203 and relaxed removal standards for these claims
in 9 U.S.C. § 205. While this implementing legislation does not com-
pletely strip state courts of jurisdiction to hear claims under the New
York Convention, 130 these federal jurisdictional grants should be
viewed as a congressional preference for federal courts to satisfy the
treaty obligations that the New York Convention imposes upon the
United States.
The parallel entitlements approach allows plaintiffs to avoid fed-
eral jurisdiction by enforcing a foreign confirmation judgment in-
stead of an arbitration award even though the substantive basis of
both was the arbitrator's decision. This practice elevates form over
substance at the expense of congressional preference. Treating the
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award differently than a foreign con-




127 Id. at 104-05 (citing Int'l Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, 875 F.2d 388 (1989)).
128 However, the plaintiffs claim must be careful not to include a count based on the
foreign arbitral award, since a federal court with jurisdiction over this claim via 9 U.S.C.
§ 203 could hear both claims under its supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
129 See Quigley, supra note 55, at 1064-65.
1"30 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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firmation judgment allows plaintiffs to circumvent the congressional
grant of federal jurisdiction by securing an exclusive state forum. This
result seems incongruous with the policy of allowing federal courts to
enforce national treaty obligations by adjudicating New York Conven-
tion claims. Another potential problem posed by allowing a plaintiff
the choice of forum can arise if a state court denies the plaintiffs
effort to enforce the foreign confirmation judgment upon grounds
not recognized by the New York Convention. If a state court refuses
to enforce an arbitral award for a reason other than an Article V
ground, it technically violates the New York Convention. 131 But the
Convention will not apply to an action to enforce a foreign judgment
under state law, so states are free to enforce or deny such judgments
for any reason.13 2 However, because both entitlements have the same
substantive basis-the arbitral award-foreign nations might not ap-
preciate this difference that the form of the complaint creates.
In the United States, the refusal to enforce the foreign confirma-
tion judgment will carry the force of law in every other state as a result
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution 133 as well as
principles of claim preclusion.134 Thus, one state may prevent a plain-
tiff from securing relief upon a foreign judgment in any state. Under
the parallel entitlements approach, however, states may deny judg-
ments without violating the New York Convention because plaintiffs
retain their claims based on the foreign arbitral awards. 13 5 Neverthe-
less, this tactic has the potential to confuse and anger other signato-
ries to the New York Convention by treating two claims based on the
same underlying award differendy.
4. Choice of Law
Whether a plaintiffs claim arises under federal or state law affects
the substantive law applied by federal courts. 136 This choice-of-law is-
sue exacerbates the aforementioned problem of jurisdictional choice.
Because claims based on foreign arbitral awards arise under the
New York Convention as a matter of federal law, 137 a state court or
federal district court evaluating such a claim should apply the provi-
131 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Of course, states are still bound to follow
the New York Convention under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See U.S.
CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
132 See infra Part III.B.4.
133 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
134 Denial of a claim will trigger claim preclusion if the plaintiff tries to raise the same
claim in another U.S. jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17(2)
(1982).
135 Given the interrelated nature of the claims, though, one might expect some messy
preclusion problems here as well.
136 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
137 See 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2000).
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sions of the New York Convention.' 8 However, if a plaintiff pursued
satisfaction of a foreign judgment, state law would apply, and a state
court would apply the provisions its own law. 13' If a plaintiff pursued
recognition of the foreign judgment under state law but filed a claim
in a federal court based on diversity of citizenship, 1 4 1 the federal dis-
trict court would be required to hear the case under state law even
though the claim originated from a foreign arbitral award governed
by federal law.
1 4 1
Perhaps of equal concern as allowing plaintiffs the choice of fo-
rum, this choice of law would produce the anomalous situation in
which a plaintiff could obtain federal jurisdiction through diversity of
citizenship and then convince a federal court to decide the case on
state law grounds despite a strong underlying federal element. t4 2 As
explained above, it could also lead to the circumvention of Article V
defenses, because they do not exist under state law.
143
C. One Further Complication: The Effect of Full Faith
and Credit
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, 144 along
with its implementing legislation, 145 further obfuscates the possible
reach of these tactics. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, "the
judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and
effect, in every other court in the United States, which it had in the
state where it was pronounced." 146 Applying this principle to the pre-
sent matter, suppose an award-holding plaintiff takes a foreign judg-
ment confirming an arbitral award into a state with a foreign money
judgments statute and obtains a state judgment based on the foreign
judgment. Assuming the first state renders a valid judgment, the
plaintiff could ostensibly enforce this state judgment in a second state
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause even if the second state has no
foreign judgments confirmation statute and therefore would only be
138 See id. § 205; supra note 131.
139 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney 1997). A federal court would most
likely not have jurisdiction to hear a satisfaction-of-a-foreignjudgment claim without diver-
sity of citizenship and would, in such a case, be required to apply state law. See Erie, 304
U.S. at 64.
140 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This is a likely scenario given that many claimants are foreign
parties attempting to gain recognition and enforcement of a judgment against American
parties.
141 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 64.
142 See, e.g., id. at 77-78. But see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
366-67 (1943) (holding that if a sufficiently high federal interest exists, federal courts may
apply federal law).
143 See supra Part III.B.2.
144 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
145 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
146 Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818).
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required to recognize and enforce the award through an action based
on the New York Convention. If a claim based on the arbitral award
becomes stale or would be invalid for reasons articulated under Arti-
cle V, 147 this approach would require states to recognize an entitle-
ment they would otherwise not need to honor solely because of a
sister state's recognition laws. While this approach appears to be unt-
ested, it could signal a potential state sovereignty problem.
IV
MAKING THE CASE FOR A MODIFIED
LIMITED-IN-SCOPE APPROACH
Given the tactics created by the parallel entitlements approach
and the potential hazards they create for national policy, 148 the
United States should resolve the relationship between foreign arbitral
awards and confirmation judgments in favor of a new approach
modeled after the limited-in-scope approach. Adopting this approach
would conform to the United States' obligations under the New York
Convention 149 without allowing the circumvention tactics outlined
above.
Recall that the limited-in-scope approach requires the award
holder to bring its claim for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award based on the award itself.150 The foreign confirmation
judgment confers no new entitlement on the plaintiff outside the ju-
risdiction of the court that rendered the judgment. 51 However, in-
stead of completely disregarding the confirmation judgment for the
purposes of the new litigation, courts outside the rendering jurisdic-
tion should ignore it only when evaluating the sufficiency of the award
holder's claim. This approach requires a plaintiff to file its claim
under the New York Convention and its implementing federal legisla-
tion, 152 allowing the provisions governing statutes of limitations, Arti-
cle V defenses, and federal jurisdiction to operate. This would in turn
resolve any choice-of-law issues.
A modified limited-in-scope approach would still permit the for-
eign court's findings to be used for issue preclusion purposes, satisfy-
147 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
148 See supra Parts III.B, III.C.
149 See supra Part I.B.3.
150 See VARADY ET AL., supra note 25.
151 See supra Part I.B.3.
152 By eliminating the entitlement based on the foreign judgment for sufficiency pur-
poses, the limited-in-scope approach offers the plaintiff no choice as to how to pursue
relief. See supra Part III.A (discussing various ways that plaintiffs can manipulate the paral-
lel entitlements approach by choosing the means by which to seek relief).
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ing the important public interests in judicial economy. 153 In this
fashion, the limited-in-scope approach achieves the proper balance by
giving the deference to foreign arbitral awards required by the New
York Convention 5 4 without conferring a gratuitous entitlement upon
plaintiffs.
A. How the Limited-in-Scope Approach Eliminates the Parallel
Entitlements Tactics
The limited-in-scope approach eliminates many of the ill effects
of jurisdictional tactics. By refusing to recognize a foreign judgment
as having effect outside the rendering jurisdiction, a court applying
this approach would leave the plaintiff with the foreign arbitral award
itself as the only basis for recovery. The award then becomes subject
to the provisions of the New York Convention and its implementing
federal legislation. 155 Because these statutes apply directly to arbitral
awards enforced under the Convention, a plaintiff cannot circumvent
the statute of limitations or destroy federal jurisdiction, as it could by
basing its claim upon a collateral foreign judgment. 156 Moreover, be-
cause such a claim arises under the New York Convention, the de-
fenses found in Article V apply directly, 57 and the defendant need
not attempt to plead these equitably and rely on the good graces of
the court, as it must if the plaintiff attempts to enforce the confirma-
tion judgment.1
5 8
B. Collateral Estoppel and the Confirmation Judgment
Using a foreign confirmation judgment for claim preclusion pur-
poses seems to violate the United States' obligations under the New
York Convention, 159 and allowing the foreign judgment to become a
freestanding entitlement ignores important federal policies. 60 But al-
lowing courts to examine a foreign confirmation judgment for issue
preclusion purposes harms neither of these interests. Because a for-
eign court's confirmation judgment is not itself an arbitral award, it
need only be analyzed as a foreign judgment and does not need to be
analyzed under the New York Convention's requirements. Moreover,
at present, no international covenant governing the recognition and
153 For a law and economics explanation of these interests, see POSNER, supra note 103,
at 593-94.
154 See New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V.
155 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-207 (2000).
156 See supra Part III.A.
157 See id. § 207.
158 See supra Part llI.B.2.
159 See supra Part I.B.1.
160 See supra Part III.B.
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enforcement of foreign judgments exists. 161 Therefore, unlike arbi-
tral awards arising under the New York Convention, the United States
has no international obligation to recognize and enforce foreign
judgments.
Nevertheless, a foreign judgment confirming an arbitral award
may have utility for courts because it represents an independent tribu-
nal's examination of the arbitral award's validity. A proceeding to
confirm an arbitral award in a foreign nation will likely examine simi-
lar issues to those a court in the United States would examine at the
recognition and enforcement phase.1 62 Given this similarity, simply
ignoring the existence of the foreign judgment seems similarly prob-
lematic. The Supreme Court has held that a strong federal interest
exists in the res judicata effect of a judgment.1 63 Moreover, forcing
American courts to reexamine issues that a competent court has al-
ready evaluated would crowd dockets and lead to other frivolous
costs. 164 Consequently, American courts should require the award-
holding party to file a claim under the New York Convention (and
thus under federal law) but allow it to plead the confirmation judg-
ment as res judicata on certain issues.
C. Laying Out the Proposal: A Two-Step Solution
1. Step One: Eliminate Claims Based on the Foreign Judgment
The first step in implementing the modified limited-in-scope ap-
proach would be to eliminate the foreign judgment as a separate enti-
tlement. This could be done in one of several ways. First, Congress
could forbid federal courts from considering such claims by statute. 165
However, while this would prevent plaintiffs' choice of state law in fed-
eral courts, 166 it would fail to regulate the filing of claims based on
foreign judgments in state courts.1 67 Another possibility would be for
161 See Paige, supra note 7, at 622.
162 See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara,
335 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing enforcement actions in courts of "primary"
jurisdiction as evaluating more expansive provisions of domestic law than "secondary"
courts in which recognition and enforcement are sought). But seeYusuf Ahmed Alghanim
& Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (reading set-aside actions to
allow application of domestic law in addition to New York Convention provisions).
163 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 344-45 (2005).
164 See POSNER, supra note 103, at 593-94.
165 Congress has constitutional plenary power over the federal courts. See U.S. CONST.
art. III.
166 See supra Part III.B.4.
167 Congress could ostensibly prevent state courts from hearing New York Convention
claims altogether by amending the implementing statute to include an "explicit statutory
directive" requiring exclusive jurisdiction. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459-61 (1990);
supra note 119 and accompanying text. However, Congress might not be able to constitu-
tionally prevent a state court from hearing a claim under its own state law, as such an
action would raise serious federalism concerns.
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each state to amend its Uniform Judgments Act to bar claims based on
judgments that merely confirm foreign arbitral awards. However, this
would pose a serious collective action problem.
As such, the best approach would be to overturn Island Territory of
Curacao6 and develop a practice of rejecting enforcement of confir-
mation judgments as a matter of federal common law. 169 This prac-
tice, in turn, would bind state courts, since the federal interest in
implementing the New York Convention would preempt state uni-
form-judgments law according to the reverse-Erie doctrine.
70
Because it would displace state law, this approach would inevita-
bly raise federalism concerns. However, the interest of states in hav-
ing their uniform judgments law apply to this small subset of claims
seems relatively insignificant, while the federal interest in abiding by
international treaty obligations seems more substantial.
1 7'
2. Step Two: Allow Courts to Apply Issue Preclusion
As outlined above, principles of judicial economy dictate that en-
forcing courts should not completely ignore foreign judgments con-
firming arbitral awards.17 2 Instead, the second step in implementing
the modified limited-in-scope approach calls upon courts to examine
these judgments for issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) effect.
Such an approach would parallel the approach already taken under
the New York Convention with regard to set aside. 173 Under the New
York Convention, a court, in evaluating whether or not to enforce the
set-aside award, will examine the set-aside ruling and decide whether
to apply res judicata to the issues decided. 74 Similarly, a modified
limited-in-scope approach would allow a plaintiff to plead the con-
tents of a foreign confirmation judgment on the issues actually deter-
168 See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, 356 F. Supp. 1, 14 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
169 I am grateful to Professor Kevin Clermont for suggesting this approach.
170 SeeJohnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988);
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. W. Ry. of
Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949). See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie (Cornell Legal Stud-
ies, Research Paper No. 05-021, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=785124 (laying out the theory of how federal law applies in state court
actions by preemption when state law interferes with the effect of federal law).
171 See supra Part III.B.3.
172 See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
173 New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V1 (e). If an award holder files a claim
based on a foreign arbitral award, the defendant can raise set aside as a defense. This
defense, however, does not bar the plaintiff's claim, but is merely a permissive ground for
dismissal,
174 See, e.g., Int'l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial
y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that the set-aside provision
of the Convention allows foreign courts to set aside only based on violations of the arbitral
procedures and not an arbitrator's failings in applying substantive law).
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mined. As it does in the case of set aside, the court would retain the
capacity to reject applying res judicata and pass judgment on the is-
sues if it opposes the foreign court's process.
As is usually the case with issue preclusion, the court examining
collateral estoppel should not give any issue more preclusive effect
than it would have under the law of the forum that rendered judg-
ment on that issue.1 75 The collateral estoppel approach would not
require American courts to embrace foreign confirmation judgments
based on defendants' defaults, 17 6 nor would it necessitate that courts
deviate from common practice and apply collateral estoppel to issues
not actually litigated. 
77
In this respect, the modified limited-in-scope approach achieves a
balance between fairness and economy. It allows a foreign court's as-
sessment to play a role in an American legal proceeding without being
unduly controlling or conferring legal rights that may not be com-
mensurate with American policy.
CONCLUSION
Despite the popularity of international commercial arbitration to
settle disputes and the increasing number of claims filed based on
foreign arbitral awards, little scholarship exists regarding how foreign
judgments confirming arbitral awards relate to the original awards.
Because this relationship affects the litigation strategies of parties in
actions to recognize and enforce arbitral awards, this issue deserves
closer inspection than has been devoted to it. In the United States,
the Second Circuit has adopted the parallel entitlements approach
that affords plaintiffs an additional means to gain recognition and en-
forcement of their awards. While this approach can be reconciled
with the United States' obligations as a signatory of the New York Con-
vention, it raises serious concerns by creating a cause of action that is
independent and severable from its underlying source-the arbitral
award.
By divorcing the foreign judgment from the award that it con-
firms, the parallel entitlements approach may lead to the counterin-
tuitive result of allowing plaintiffs to satisfy awards under state law that
would otherwise be unenforceable under the New York Convention.
175 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 95 (1971) (stating that the law
of the state where the judgment was rendered should govern the issues determined by a
valid judgment, subject to constitutional limitations); see also Harper v. Del. Valley Broad-
casters, 743 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (D. Del. 1990) (applying federal preclusion law to a fed-
eral bankruptcy court's judgment under Delaware choice-of-law rules).




Among the most serious calamities associated with creating an ad-
ditional claim under the parallel entitlements approach are that it al-
lows litigants to make an end-run around the federal statute of
limitations for foreign arbitral awards and to circumvent defendants'
Article V objections under the New York Convention. Perhaps most
strikingly, this approach enables enforcing parties to guarantee state
jurisdiction and the application of state law for issues that seem wholly
federal. The clear federal interest in overseeing treaty performance,
as well as a clear jurisdictional directive from Congress designed to
ensure federal oversight, seems to demand a different outcome. By
comparison, a modified limited-in-scope approach would allow the
proper balance between facilitating the enforcement of foreign arbi-
tral awards and protecting national interests. By examining foreign
confirmation judgments for the contours of their decisions and apply-
ing issue preclusion, federal courts could ensure that plaintiffs with
valid foreign awards can efficiently and reliably satisfy their claims.
This approach would prevent plaintiffs from pursuing tactics that
avoid important federal legislation, while also ensuring the federal
scrutiny necessary for implementing an international treaty.
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